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A current summary discussed non-technically for the
information of practicing accountants

Liability
of Professional Accountants
to Clients and Others
R. James Gormley and Robert M. Trueblood
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T H E QUARTERLY

A s American business grows larger, the potential losses
from business failure become greater for both creditors
and investors. This economic circumstance is being' experienced in a social environment characterized by an
increasing tendency of enterprises and individuals to
attempt to recoup losses of all kinds in the courts. And
courts, generally, are seeming to become more liberal in
granting redress for losses of all kinds.
Financial distress and failure in business are increasingly accompanied by searches for scapegoats. Naturally
enough, the auditors have become favorite candidates.
The rise in the amount of litigation against accountants
and its possible effect on the profession are discussed in
"The Specter of Auditors' Liability," in The Journal of
Accountancy for September, 1965.
It is natural for an accountant to be incredulous at the
thought that he could be guilty of fraud in the absence
of intentional dishonesty on his part. Accordingly, the
purpose of this article is to describe briefly to practicing
accountants the extent of the legal liability of an accountant to his client and to others in connection with his professional services. T h e nature of due care, negligence, and
fraud in the practice of accounting will be discussed, and
the legal consequences which may follow them will be
described. Since the article has been written for laymen
and since a serious attempt has been made to avoid technical analysis, all legal citations and other references have
been omitted.
Definitions
Basic definitions of several legal terms are set forth
below, since these words and phrases and variations of
them are used repeatedly in the discussion which follows.
Actually, these few terms recapitulate much of the subject matter of the article.
Due care and competence is that degree of care and
competence which is reasonably expected of accountants, as members of a learned and skilled profession,
in performing and reporting on professional engagements.
Negligence (or ordinary negligence) is the failure of
an accountant to perform or report on a professional
engagement with the due care and competence reasonably expected of members of his profession.
Gross negligence is an extreme, flagrant, or reckless
departure from standards of due care and competence in performing or reporting on professional
engagements—as contrasted with the thoughtless
I slip, honest blunder, or error of judgment which
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amounts to ordinary negligence.
\-^H*e fraud of,«d*£.ek is an intentional false representation of a material fact or opinion made to induce
a person's reliance, and under circumstances in
which the person justifiably does rely upon the false
representation to his injury. The courts have said
that an auditor commits -the fraud of deceit in issuing an audit opinion if his audit has been so negligent as to justify the jury or a judge in concluding
that the auditor could have had no genuine belief
in the truth of his opinion. Evidence of negligence,
and especially of gross negligence, on the part of
the auditor may be considered by the trier-of-fact in
deciding whether the facts support or do not support
an inference that the auditor committed deceit. Evidence of heedlessness and reckless disregard of consequences may be considered in deciding whether or
not the necessary element of intention was present
i to warrant a finding of fraud.
Liability to client
Accountants are members of a learned and skilled profession. Their professional status imposes an obligation to
exercise the care and competence reasonably expected of
persons in their profession, and to adhere to accepted
professional standards. A similar responsibility applies to
all professional experts, and has been described by the
American Law Institute as follows:
. . . If the matter is one which requires investigation,
the supplier of the information must exercise reasonable care and competence to ascertain the facts on
which his statement is based. He must exercise the
competence reasonably expected of one in his business or professional position in drawing inferences . ..
H e must exercise reasonable care and competence in
communicating the information so that it may be
understood by the recipient. . .
If a n accountant fails to exercise care and competence in
performing and reporting on his auditing, accounting,
tax, or management service engagements—he commits
ordinary negligence. And he may be held liable for the
damages resulting to his client.
T h e American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
has formally defined professional standards of qualification such as education, experience, proficiency, judgment,
and independence. The profession has also specified certain standards and some procedures to be used in the performance of and reporting upon audits. These professional
statements of generally accepted auditing standards and
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procedures will be given great, and perhaps decisive,
weight in court in adjudicating liability.
The duties and responsibilities of an auditor are also
governed, and may properly be limited, by the contractual terms of his engagement and the representations
in his audit report. The scope of most audit engagements
is defined in the standard auditor's report, which consists
of his representations—primarily of fact in the first paragraph, and of opinion in the second.' The representations
in the short form opinion incorporate the profession's
auditing standards and procedures and accounting principles, which are found in part in authoritative professional statements; in part in individual statements of
respected writers; and in important part, in practical
applications which are considered by an appreciable segment of the profession to be acceptable. If the scope of
the auditor's assignment and duties is limited by the contract of his employment, any such limitation must be
clearly described in his report.
If an auditor has performed his audit with care and
in accordance with professional standards, he should not
be held liable for an inaccuracy in financial statements
which would not necessarily be detected in an examina :
tion of the type and scope of his engagement. A court
recently said: "Those who hire [public accountants] are
not justified in expecting infallibility, but can expect only
reasonable care and competence. They purchase service,
not insurance . . . " For example, an auditor should not
ordinarily be held responsible for the breakdown of an
apparently satisfactory system of internal control because
of collusive fraud among several persons at the top of a
client organization, since groups of people at high levels
have both the authority and the opportunity to contravene any system of internal control—no matter how well
designed.
Even if the auditor has been negligent in his audit performance, he should not be held liable to the client unless
the client can prove that he suffered loss; that his loss
was the result of the auditor's negligence; and that the
loss did not result in part from the client's own negligence in administering its business and supervising its
employees. If, for example, an auditor recommends the
installation of improved procedures for the protection of
inventory and his client ignores the advice, it is difficult
to conceive that the client would have redress against the
auditor for failing to detect subsequent inventory losses
which were concealed or obscured by inadequate inventory controls.
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Before an accountant takes much comfort in the generality that he is not an insurer, he should, however,
reflect that these rules are easier to state in the abstract
than they are to apply to a set of facts with a confident
prediction of the outcome in court.
The crucial issues in accountant's liability lawsuits are
usually questions of fact as to whether the accountants
deviated from standards of due care and competence in
the engagement, and if so, whether their deviation
amounted to negligence, gross negligence, or fraud. These
questions must be decided by a trier-of-fact (judge or
jury) by applying the appropriate rules of law to the evidence adduced at the trial. In so doing, the trier-of-fact
may often be guided to a sound decision by expert
accounting testimony and reference to the professional
literature. Like all humans, however, triers-of-fact will be
influenced to some extent by their own values, backgrounds, and experience. Some triers-of-fact may begin
the fact-finding process with ignorance, or even a serious
misconception of the whole professional issue. For example, some members of the public and, therefore, some
members of a jury might wrongly assume that any error
in an audited financial statement is a fault of the auditor.
Moreover, a trier-of-fact has no objective means of
detecting what specific acts of human behavior will transform due care into negligence, negligence into gross negligence, or gross negligence into fraud. There are no clear
lines of demarcation between the categories. This means
that in any close question (and most of those which are
litigated to a conclusion are somewhat close), some triersof-fact might reach one conclusion (e.g., due care) and
some another (e.g., negligence). In any given case, the
facts and the rules of law are the same. The determination
of the trier-of-fact is, however, decisive. The outcome of
each case depends upon the judge's or the jury's reaction
to and interpretation of the evidence presented, and their
understanding and evaluation of the rules of law to be
applied to the facts as they find them.
This confronts the auditor with some hard questions.
Does every mistake, every oversight, constitute negligence?
Does every rough edge, every loose end, every management
explanation accepted in full, every benefit of a doubt in
favor of the client — expose the auditor to damages and
loss of reputation? T h e answer should be no — if the
standard of duty is due care and competence, and if the
auditor is not an insurer. However, the answer may not be
that easy if there have been losses, in view of the judicial
fact-finding process.
T H E QUARTERLY

Liability to others wider the common law — negligence
In the United States, and until recently in England,
the courts have generally held negligent accountants to
be liable only to their clents—not to third parties.
—"FirSt, the courts have concluded on pragmatic grounds
that the hazards of public accounting practice would be
too extreme if the commission of ordinary negligence
(such as a thoughtless slip or blunder) were to ". . . expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount
for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class." (By
Contrast, however, some other professionals whose exposure to third persons is limited in numbers and in
amount have been held liable to third persons for negligence.)
ISecond, the courts have said that auditors should not be
liable for negligence to creditors and investors if their
report ". . . was primarily for the benefit of the [client] . . .
for use in the development of the business, and only incidentally or collaterally for the use of those to whom [the
client] and his associates might exhibit it thereafter." This
is the primary benefit rule. It is based on the thought that
a company ordinarily needs audited financial statements
for many purposes — for management guidance, taxes,
debt and equity investors, lenders, suppliers, customers —
no single purpose alone being a decisive reason for obtaining audited statements.
Thus far the primary benefit rule has been an important protection to auditors from liability to persons other
than their clients for ordinary negligence. Audits have
been held to be for the primary benefit of the client even
in cases in which the auditor knew that his report would
be furnished by the client, or was to be furnished by the
auditor at the request of the client, to a third person. The
primary benefit rule has also been invoked when it was
known that the audit report would be used by the client
to induce action by a third person (such as a creditor or
an investor), and might be relied upon by that person in
taking action. Of course, a third-party plaintiff may always attempt to prove that as a matter of fact the particular audit in his case was for the primary benefit of the
plaintiff, rather than for the primary benefit of the client.
In reported decisions, however, the triers-of-fact (both
judge and jury) have ruled for the auditors on the fact
question in such circumstances.
Nonetheless, the existing decisions do not mean that
there can be no such thing as an audit or a report for the
primary benefit of someone other than the client —
especially if the report is of a specialized nature which
is likely to be of interest or is delivered only to a single
MARCH,
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person or category of persons (such as a lender), rather
than to all of the persons interested in the financial affairs
of the client. Consider these examples: an opinion of an
accountant, delivered directly or indirectly to a lender, to
the effect that in his annual audit he observed no breaches
in the restrictions of a loan agreement; or the accountant's comfort letter addressed both to the client and underwriters of its securities and delivered in fulfillment of a
condition precedent to the obligation of the underwriters
to purchase the securities; or special receivables audits
required by lenders on collateralized debt. It remains to
be established whether any of these or other special audits
or reports are considered to be for the primary benefit of
persons other than the client.
Recently the primary benefit rule has been under attack
in courts and in the literature, and there may be some
danger of partial erosion of this protection to auditors.
The rule was upheld and applied by the English court of
appeal in 1951, but in the face of a strong dissent which
argued that: (a) the duty of avoiding negligence extends
". . . also . . . to any [specific] third person to whom [the
auditors] themselves show the accounts, or to whom they
know their employer is going to show the accounts so as
to induce him to invest money or take some other action
on them"; (b) an auditor might possibly be liable also
". . . if he prepared his accounts for the guidance of a
specific class of persons in a specific class of transactions";
(c) the auditors' duty should not, however, apply to
strangers of whom they have heard nothing and to whom
the client may show their accounts without their knowledge or consent.
Auditors cannot help but foresee that their reports on
financial statements of a client will in fact be relied upon
by existing and prospective lenders, creditors, investors,
and other persons dealing with the client. In some cases
the numbers of such persons may be large and their aggregate commitments in the client may be great. The language of the dissenting opinion could raise a question as
to whether at least some of those groups are "a specific
class of persons in a specific class of transactions" to whom
the dissenting judge would have thought that auditors
should be liable for negligence.
In 1963, the dissent in the 1951 case was cited with
approval in the Hedley Byrne case, which was ruled on by
the highest court of England. T h a t case did not involve a
report of auditors, but rather an accommodation credit
report by a bank, innocently given but negligently worded,
on which a third person relied to his damage. In their
opinions the justices spoke variously of "special," "particu-
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lar," "direct,'" and "proximate" relationships between
defendant and plaintiff, but the justices were unable to
formulate a general guide as to the circumstances which
do or do not create such a "special relationship."
It remains to be seen whether the "special relationship*'
concept of the Hedley Byrne decision will affect the primary benefit rule in the United States. English decisions
sometimes, but not always, influence United States courts
— and vice versa. No departures from the primary benefit rule have been found in reported United States decisions involving accountants. However, a committee of the
well-regarded American Law Institute has recently suggested, with reference to Hedley Byrne and other recent
decisions, that the correct interpretation of the law would
now apply a duty of care, not necessarily ". . . to the very
large class of persons whom almost any negligently given
information may foreseeably reach and influence," but at
least ". . . to the comparatively small group (not necessarily identified by individuals) whom the defendant
expects and intends to influence."
As published in The Journal of Accountancy for October, 1965, it is reported to be the view of legal counsel to
the Council of The Institute of Chartered Accountants in
England and Wales that the Hedley Byrne principle will
subject accountants to liability to third persons for loss
resulting from negligence only " . . . in circumstances where
the accountants knew or ought to have known that the
reports, accounts, or financial statements in question were
being prepared for the specific purpose or transaction
which gave rise to the loss and that they would be shown
to and relied upon by third parties in that particular connection." Such a view, if confirmed by the English courts,
might tend to limit, though not necessarily eliminate altogether, the apparent disparity between the American
primary benefit rule and the English special relationship
rule.
To illustrate the possible difference between the primary benefit rule and the special relationship rule, consider the case of the auditor who performs a periodic audit
and knows (as he is bound to) that his client is required
by a loan or merger agreement to deliver financial statements reported on by independent accountants. One could
predict with some confidence that the auditor would be
protected by the primary benefit rule against liability to
the other party to the agreement for ordinary negligence.
But one of the justices in Hedley Byrne said that if an
expert or informed person ". . . takes it upon himself to
give information or advice to, or allows his information
or advice to be passed on to. another person who, as he
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knows or should know, will place reliance upon it, then
a duty of care will arise."
So if the special relationship rule should wholly or
partly supplant the primary benefit rule in the United
States, auditors would become exposed to liability for
negligence to some part of the "indeterminate" class from
which they have heretofore been protected. Thus far the
English courts have articulated their new rule only imperfectly. If the United States courts were to adopt the rule
at all, the degree of increased exposure would remain
uncertain until the rule was applied in litigation.
Liability to others under the common law — fraud
Even though an auditor may not be liable to persons
other than his client for ordinary negligence, he will be
exposed to liability to others if the deficiencies or lapses
in his professional work are of such magnitude that the
issuance of his report constitutes deceit, which is one of
the categories of fraud.
Deceit is defined legally as the intentional misstatement
or concealment of a material fact or opinion for the purpose of inducing another to act in reliance upon it.
An auditor who commits deceit may. be held liable to
the persons whom he should have reason to expect to act
or refrain from acting in reliance upon his deceit — for
loss suffered by them in any of the types of transactions
in which he should expect their conduct to be influenced
by his deceit. Such a liability could extend to those among
the potentially large number of present and prospective
security-holders, suppliers, customers, contractors, and
others whom the auditor should have reason to expect to
act or to forbear to act in reliance upon the auditor's report. It is a question of fact as to which of those persons
the auditor would have a duty, varying according to the
circumstances of different cases. One cannot predict confidently how any specified question of fact would be
decided by various triers-of-fact, except that the decisions
would undoubtedly not be consistent.
In any case, the exposure of the auditor to liability for
fraud would not be limited to the relatively small group
referred to in the preceding section who might be able to
prove that the auditor issued his report for their "primary
benefit," or (under the broader rule) that there was a
"special relationship" between the group and the auditor.
The scope of liability for deceit is broader than for negligence because a deception is considered more culpable
than mere carelessness.
An allegation against an accountant for deceit would
ordinarily arise in connection with his audit report. The
T H E QUARTERLY

standard audit report carries the implicit representation
that the issuer is a competent expert in auditing.
The first paragraph of the standard report contains
representations which are largely, though not wholly, representations of fact. T h e auditor represents that he has
examined the financial statements of a concern, in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, and by
such auditing procedures as in his reasonable opinion were
necessary in the circumstances. If the evidence should
reveal significant gaps or omissions in the audit program
or serious incompetence or carelessness of staff work or
supervision, such facts might support an allegation that
the statements of what was done were deceptive misrepreI sentations and might justify a trier-of-fact in so deciding.
The second paragraph of the standard opinion contains
representations of opinion that the financial statements
present fairly the financial position and results of operation of the concern. If the evidence should suggest that the
audit deficiencies or accounting lapses were so extensive
that the auditor may have lacked reasonable ground for
I believing in the accuracy of his opinion, such circumstances might support an allegation that the auditor's
opinion was a deceptive misrepresentation and might
justify the trier-of-fact in so deciding.
As was stated in one decision:
A representation certified as true to the knowledge
of the accountants when knowledge there is none,
a reckless misstatement, or an opinion based on
grounds so flimsy as to lead to the conclusion that
there was no genuine belief in its truth, are all sufficient upon which to base liability. A refusal to see
the obvious, a failure to investigate the doubtful, if
sufficiently gross, may furnish evidence leading to an
inference of fraud so as to impose liability for losses
suffered by those who rely on the balance sheet. In
other words, heedlessness and reckless disregard of
consequence may take the place of deliberate intention.
Whether or not an auditor has committed fraudulent
misrepresentation is a factual question for the jury or
judge, based on expert testimony and other evidence.
Facts indicating either ordinary negligence (a blunder or
error of judgment) or gross negligence (serious lapses in
the coverage or review of the audit work) may be considered by the finder of fact in considering whether the
accountant could reasonably have had a genuine belief
in the accuracy of his report.
MARCH,
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Liability to others under the federal securities acts
Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 deprives the
accountant of some of his most important protections in
suits by third persons. An accountant who certifies financial statements in a registration statement under the
Securities Act of 1933 is subject to the liabilities of
Section 11.
An investor in a security registered under the act who
can prove that the certified financial statements contained an omission or misstatement of material importance
may sue the certifying accountant for the amount of his
loss, without being obliged to prove:
(1) negligence or fraud by the accountant in auditing
the statements;
(2) reliance on the accountant's opinion (unless plaintiff acquired his securities after the issuer made
generally available an earnings statement for a
period of at least twelve months beginning after
the effective date of the registration statement) ;
(3) a causal relationship between the omission or misstatement and his loss;
(4) a contractual relationship with the accountant,
issuer, sellers, or underwriters. Thus, even a
stranger purchasing the registered security in the
open market is entitled to recover under the
section.
T h e suit would be barred by the statute of limitations,
unless the plaintiff shows that he sued within one year
after he discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the alleged omission or
misstatement—and in any case within three years after
the security was offered to the public.
T h e accountant may escape liability if he is able to
sustain the burden of proof that after making reasonable
investigation, he had reasonable ground to believe that
the financial statements certified by him contained no
material omission or misstatement. In effect, the accountant will be held liable unless he can prove that he was
not negligent. And that is indeed a rigorous standard.
T h e auditor may also undertake to prove, if he can,
that there was no causal relationship between the omission or misstatement and plaintiff's loss, or that plaintiff
knew of the omision or misstatement when he acquired
the security.
Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
could subject accountants to liability for loss to persons
who purchased or sold securities in reliance upon financial statements containing material misstatements or
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omissions certified by the accountants and filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission under the act on
such forms as 8-K and 10-K. Under this section, the
plaintiff must prove reliance upon the omission or misstatement, and although privity (a contract relationship)
is no requisite and plaintiff need not prove negligence or
fraud by the accountant, the accountant is entitled to
prove that he acted in good faith and had no knowledge
that the statement was false or misleading. It therefore
appears that under the 1934 Act the standards of liability
are probably similar or equivalent to those of fraud under
the common law (and, accordingly, are less stringent than
under the 1933 Act). If so, the legal exposure of accountants to liability to third persons may not be significantly
increased, as a practical matter, by this provision of the
1934 Act.
State

Laws

No attempt was made for the purpose of this summary
to search the securities and other statutes of 50 states for
provisions imposing statutory liability on accountants. A
brief check of secondary sources suggests that there may
be very little in the way of state statutes which specifically
impose liability on accountants for negligence, or of more
general state statutes which have been applied to impose
liability on accountants for negligence. Nonetheless, federal and state securities laws contain fraud provisions
which are broad enough to apply to an accountant if his
activities are such as to involve him as a participant in a
fraudulent sale or purchase of securities. And, there is
extensive state legislation on the licensing, regulating, and
disciplining of accountants.
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The above summary suggests that despite important
defenses, practicing accountants have an extensive and
probably increasing degree of exposure to clients and
others arising from their accounting and auditing services. The damage to an accountant's purse can be severe.
T h e damage to his reputation can be irreparable. The
emotional cost of involvement can be deadly.
This article has been written primarily to describe the
risk, rather than to prescribe for it. But there are two
things which accountants should do, one of them comparatively minor and the other all-important.
Accountants should become more conscious of the
degree of responsibility which they are assuming to persons other than their clients, for which they may be receiving no commensurate fee. When called upon to furnish special reports or other information to third persons,
accountants should seriously consider insisting on a stipulation that such reports are furnished without responsibility to persons other than their client, or they should
incorporate a disclaimer of responsibility to third persons
in each such report.
More importantly, accountants must redouble their
vigilance in the performance of their work. They must
assure that the work performed by their professional staffs
is of the highest quality at all levels. They must assure
that the supervision and review of staff work is adequate
to detect deficiencies, and that technical competence is
complemented with mature business judgment. This is
the surest and the most direct way to minimize the risk
of liability to clients and others.

*

*

*
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